Global Chaos and Fragility in the Middle East

A technical recession is commonly defined as two consecutive quarters of declining real GDP, yet broader economic downturns often encompass a constellation of additional factors. In a striking parallel, the United States appears to have entered a cycle of political crisis—a “political recession” of its own.

Just as an economic recession exposes underlying weaknesses in a nation’s financial system, the re-election of Trump has laid bare a prolonged erosion of American political institutions. This crisis is marked by dwindling public trust, entrenched institutional gridlock, an increasing inability to address geopolitical challenges and disturbing its own alliance map—symptoms of systemic stagnation rather than mere episodic instability.

This instability is not confined to the United States; rather, it reverberates across the global stage. In the decades following the twin post-millennium invasions, a broader political depression has taken shape—a systemic crisis of capitalism that has both contributed to and been exacerbated by American political decay.

The two Bush-era invasions gave way to the inconsistent policies of the Obama administration, which were then followed by the reckless unpredictability of Trump. The crisis deepened further in the wake of COVID-19, and with Biden largely inheriting a mix of Obama’s geopolitical strategies and Trump’s approach to global economic relations, the “American problem” has only continued to escalate. As the world now braces for the consequences of what is, in effect, a second Trump era, Washington’s instability has become a burden that the entire international community must bear.

Nowhere is the impact of America’s internal malaise felt more acutely than in the Middle East. Following the Cold War, the region became the principal theater of U.S. military interventions—invasions that, having begun in the late 20th century, have left an indelible mark well into the 21st. After 9/11, Washington reduced its foreign policy to an almost singular focus on counterterrorism, a myopic strategy that has exacted heavy costs both domestically and abroad.

In its bid to preserve a geopolitical order centered around Israel, the United States has imposed the burdens of its overreach onto the broader region. Now, as the American problem metastasizes globally, its repercussions are intensifying in the Middle East, further exacerbating regional fragilities and ushering in a new era of uncertainty.

The fragile order that has long sustained Israel-centric “sustainable instability” in the Middle East is now under stress. Israel, deeply reliant on American geopolitical and security guarantees, will inevitably come under strain as Washington’s retreat from global engagement accelerates. Even if it continues to enjoy a protective umbrella, the shifting dynamics of U.S. politics—particularly the fervor of Israel’s supporters within the new administration—will complicate efforts to maintain the existing regional order.

In this rapidly evolving landscape, Middle Eastern actors will be forced to rationalize their geopolitical strategies. Two primary forces underpin this imperative.

First is the inexorable transition toward a multipolar world. As the geopolitical map is redrawn, Washington’s escalating trade wars will compel regional powers—long accustomed to the stability of a unipolar order—to reassess their economic partnerships. While Trump’s protectionist policies were relatively easy to set in motion, each successive wave of economic nationalism further weakens cooperative frameworks, accelerating the erosion of traditional alliances. Consequently, Middle Eastern nations will increasingly seek to recalibrate their geopolitical alignments to safeguard their interests amid intensifying global trade tensions.

The second transformative force is the shifting new geopolitical significance of both Tel Aviv and Damascus. Israel is no longer merely the linchpin of an American-led regional order; it has come to symbolize a broader “Israeli problem” on both regional and global scales. Meanwhile, Syria is no longer simply a battleground for proxy conflicts among the United States, Russia, Iran, and Israel. Ankara, the clear beneficiary of the shifting dynamics in Syria, will also encounter new regional challenges. The continued U.S. presence in Syria, coupled with Israel’s ongoing occupation, remains a significant geopolitical concern for Turkey.

The Syrian revolution not only signaled the collapse of the Assad regime but also marked the unraveling of a long-maintained regional order predicated on managed instability. In parallel, Israel’s post-millennium policies—characterized by the outright denial of both the Palestinian question and the very existence of the Palestinian people—are proving increasingly untenable. The Palestinian issue, long sidelined, has reemerged as a defining factor in regional geopolitics.

Amid these shifting dynamics, those actors capable of adapting their strategies to the emerging geopolitical reality will likely secure greater influence. Likewise, beyond the region, the speed with which Europe, Russia, and China engage with this transformed Middle Eastern paradigm will determine their ability to insulate themselves from the destabilizing effects of Washington’s political disorder.

It is conceivable that the “American problem” will precipitate a fundamental shift in the global order. While such a transformation could deepen uncertainty in the Middle East, the faster regional actors update their alliance structures, the more effectively they may navigate future crises—even in the absence of a world order.